# Is the Fundamental Attribution Error Really That Important?
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The fundamental attribution error (FAE) is often touted as a key concept in social psychology, but is it truly as significant as many believe? This phenomenon, which refers to the tendency to overemphasize personal characteristics while downplaying situational factors in explaining behavior, was highlighted by social psychologist Richard Nisbett in response to the 2017 Edge question about widely known scientific concepts. Although Nisbett argues that the FAE deserves more attention, I contend that it is overstated and based on outdated distinctions between personality traits and situational influences.
Nisbett uses an analogy involving Aristotle's physics to illustrate the FAE, suggesting that people's behavior is often viewed through a purely dispositional lens. He claims that modern psychology has evolved beyond this simplistic perspective, emphasizing the necessity of situational context. However, comparing human behavior to that of inanimate objects is misleading since people possess agency and can initiate actions, unlike objects that merely respond to external forces. While contemporary psychology acknowledges both personal and situational factors in behavior, Nisbett's strong advocacy for situationism—suggesting that internal traits hold minimal relevance—merits a critical examination.
The FAE has historically been leveraged to support situationism. Nisbett points out that students and individuals in Western societies often believe that behavior aligns with personality traits. He references the Milgram experiments to illustrate how people underestimate situational influences on behavior. However, this assertion warrants a deeper analysis, as the evidence for the FAE is primarily drawn from controlled laboratory settings, not real-life situations. For example, classic experiments involving essay writing have shown that participants tend to misjudge the motivations behind actions, often attributing them to inherent beliefs rather than external pressures. Yet, this misjudgment may stem from an oversimplified dichotomy between internal and external factors, when in reality both elements coexist and interact.
In the context of Milgram's work, the notion that individuals prefer dispositional explanations overlooks the complexity of human behavior, which is influenced by both personality and situational context. Nisbett's claim that people lack awareness of their predispositions to obey authority figures may reflect an overestimation of their moral convictions rather than a dismissal of situational power.
Furthermore, the FAE is often described as a common cognitive bias, but its classification as "fundamental" remains contentious. Research indicates that when individuals are made aware of situational constraints, they do not default to dispositional attributions. As such, the FAE does not deserve the label of "fundamental," and attributing behavior to personal traits isn't always an error.
Contrary to Nisbett's assertion that most people are "pure" dispositionalists, evidence shows that laypeople do not fully subscribe to this view. Studies reveal that individuals tend to favor interactionist explanations—recognizing the interplay between situational and dispositional influences—rather than leaning heavily towards extreme situationalism or dispositionalism. This suggests that the tendency to favor one perspective over the other is often a reflection of common sense rather than a strict adherence to one theory.
In conclusion, while the fundamental attribution error has been framed as a pervasive aspect of human cognition, its significance in understanding behavior is overstated. The interplay of personality and situational factors is far more nuanced than the FAE suggests, highlighting the need for a balanced perspective that recognizes the contributions of both elements in shaping human actions.
In the subsequent part of this discussion, I will delve into Nisbett’s critiques of personality traits in explaining behavior and explore why his arguments may lack adequate support.
© Scott McGreal. Please do not reproduce without permission. Brief excerpts may be quoted as long as a link to the original article is provided.